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The Case of the Exemption Claimants:
Religion, Conscience, and Identity
Steven D. Smith, Reporter*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWGARTH, 45001
Per curiam. Pursuant to Appellate Rule 13-6(b), this appeal
consolidates three separate appeals involving different parties, and
different facts, but one common issue. In each case, a defendantappellant who has been convicted for violating a legal provision or
duty admits the violation but contends that he or she should have
been exempted from compliance under the New Constitution. We
have been directed to no previous decisions of this Court in which
this issue of constitutional exemptions has been resolved,2 and so
we consider the cases together in order to achieve a rational,
consistent, uniform resolution.
Crisp, C.J. Are citizens (or at least some citizens) entitled under
the New Constitution to be exempted from complying with a law
because they have, at least in their own judgment, exceptionally
strong reasons not to comply? The question is raised on this appeal
by three different claimants who offer three quite different
justifications for noncompliance.
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I received
editorial assistance in the preparation of this report from Larry Alexander, Marc DeGirolami,
Rick Garnett, Jill Hasday, Paul Horwitz, Michael Paulsen, Michael Perry, and George Wright.
1. Reporter’s Note: The Supreme Court of Newgarth, although relatively obscure for
the most part, is noted for one much discussed decision which was reported some years ago
by an eminent legal scholar. See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 616 (1949), reprinted in 112 HARV. L. REV. 1851 (1999). The present case was decided
by the same court, but two centuries later. (I’m afraid I must follow Professor Fuller in
declining to disclose how the time travel issues were overcome.) I report the case here
because the issues discussed by the Newgarth jurists have a strong resemblance to issues
that are debated in this country today—although, as one would expect, there are also
significant differences. In order to call attention to the similarities, I have taken the liberty,
in various places, of adding notes indicating where parallel discussions or decisions have
occurred in American jurisprudence and scholarship.
2. Reporter’s Note: This issue is fiercely debated in this country at the present time.
See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018);
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). For one collection of a range of
contemporary academic views on the subject, see RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS (Kevin Vallier &
Michael Weber eds., 2018).
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In Appeal #476-13-00, the appellant, who calls himself simply
Father Edward, is a priest who carries out his clerical vocation in
the County and City of Durham. On the evening of November 27,
Father Edward heard the confession of a parishioner, Dick Turpin.
Earlier that day, Durham police had received a report of a highway
robbery in which over one million Newgarth dollars had been
stolen from an armored security vehicle. From a photo lineup, the
vehicle’s driver had tentatively identified Turpin. The
identification could not be more than tentative because the robber’s
face had been partly covered. After police learned that Turpin had
been observed entering the confessional booth at Father Edward’s
church later on the day of the burglary, a subpoena was served on
the priest commanding him to come before a grand jury in order to
testify concerning any incriminating evidence he may have heard
during Turpin’s confession.
Appellant appeared and acknowledged having taken Turpin’s
confession, but he refused to disclose anything Turpin had told him
during the confession. Father Edward explained that in his faith a
confession before a priest is strictly confidential, and that he would
be violating his solemn duty to the church and to God if he were to
reveal what Turpin had told him. In the jurisdiction of Durham, a
privilege of spousal confidentiality is recognized, as is the attorneyclient privilege; but unlike in some of our jurisdictions, there is no
legally recognized priest-penitent privilege. For his refusal to
testify, Father Edward was accordingly held in contempt of court,
and was eventually sentenced to six months in prison. He contends
that this treatment violated his constitutional right to freedom of
religion and that he should have been exempted from the legal duty
to testify.3
In Appeal #476-13-01, appellant Francis Irenic was convicted of
violating the Newgarth Military Conscription Act, which requires
all men upon reaching the age of eighteen to register and make

3. Reporter’s Note: This precise issue was considered in People v. Philips, N.Y. Ct.
Gen. Sess. (June 14, 1813), reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 139 (3d ed. 2011). The subject has received some attention in modern legal
scholarship. See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE
AND FAIRNESS 246–60 (2006); Michael J. Mazza, Comment, Should Clergy Hold the PriestPenitent Privilege?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 171 (1998).
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themselves available for military service. The Act contains a variety
of exemptions, including exemptions for men preparing for the
medical profession and men who are married and have dependent
children. It also exempts from military service men who have a
religious objection to serving in war; “religious” is defined as being
based in beliefs about duties to a “Supreme Being.”4 Irenic refused
to register or to make himself available for military service, stating
that he had an earnest and categorical moral objection to war in any
form. He did not attempt to bring himself within the statute’s
religious exemption, however, because as he explained, his
objection is based not on any belief in duties to God, or to a
Supreme Being, but rather on his commitment to the sanctity of
human life.5
Irenic’s conscription board rejected his request for an
exemption. He nonetheless persisted in his refusal to register or
serve, and he was accordingly convicted of violating the Act and
was sentenced to five years in prison.
In Appeal #476-13-02, appellant Emilia Pescar was convicted of
violating regulation 17.6 of Newgarth’s Hunting and Fishing Code.
The regulation makes it a misdemeanor to fish in any of Newgarth’s
lakes, rivers, or streams, except during fishing season, which the
Office of Wildlife specified as running from May 1 through
September 31. Pescar was cited for fly-fishing on the Big Bonanza
River on November 13.
In her appearance before a magistrate judge, Pescar pleaded to
be excused from compliance with the law. She explained that for
her, fishing is not a livelihood or business; neither is it merely a
hobby or avocation. On the contrary, for as long as she can
remember going back to her childhood, fishing has been the core of
her identity, or her sense of who she is, and she explained in vivid
4. Reporter’s Note: The Newgarth draft law thus appears to be similar to the
applicable American law at the time of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
5. Reporter’s Note: The appellant’s pacifist commitment thus appears to be similar
to that declared by the defendant Elliot Welsh in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Welsh explained:
I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore I will not
injure or kill another human being. This belief (and the corresponding ‘duty’ to
abstain from violence toward another person) is not ‘superior to those arising from
any human relation.’ On the contrary: it is essential to every human relation.
Id. at 343 (emphasis omitted).
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and often poetic detail how fishing defines her as a person.6
Although it would also be accurate to say of Pescar that she is a
Newgarthian, a woman, a sister and aunt, a Sagittarius, a lover of
classical music, a Giants fan, a cook, and any number of other
things, in her self-conception, she does not think of herself
primarily in those terms: she thinks of herself as a fisher. Hence, to
ask her to fish only from May through September, she contended,
is in essence to require her to deny or suspend her identity—to
forego being the person she is—during more than half of each year.
The magistrate judge listened to this explanation and then
commented,
I have no doubt, Ms. Pescar, that you are sincere and
passionate about everything you’ve told me, and I can honestly
say that I sympathize with you. As it happens, I do a bit of flyfishing myself, and if I let myself, I can imagine this becoming a
kind of consuming passion for me as well. If there were some way
to allow you—and only you—to violate the fishing regulations, I
would happily excuse you. But the regulations serve a valuable
and legitimate purpose—without such limits our supply of fish
would rapidly be depleted—and there is no legal basis for
singling you out for an exemption. And so, I must reluctantly find
you guilty of a misdemeanor.

The judge then imposed a fine of $50, which is the minimum
sanction allowed under the regulations.
All three of these appellants ask to be excused for their
violations under the New Constitution (which is today something
of a misnomer because of course the instrument is now several
centuries old; but it is nonetheless “new” relative to the American
Constitution on which it was modeled after the old legal order
collapsed during the Great Spiral).7 Of course, there will always be
citizens—often thousands or even millions of them—who would
like to be excused from complying with virtually any law the
6. Reporter’s Note: A lengthy appendix to the Court’s decision sets forth a transcript
containing appellant’s explanation. Because of its length I have not reproduced it here.
However, American readers may get a sense of Pescar’s conception of herself and of fishing
by reading (or watching the film adaptation of) NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH
IT (1976).
7. Reporter’s Note: Just what the “Great Spiral” consisted of is unclear, to me at least,
but the event is referenced in Fuller, supra note 1, at 622.
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government enacts. Sometimes they have good and legitimate
reasons for wishing to be excused; and any one of us is likely to
sympathize with some of their pleas.
But to excuse citizens from their duty to obey the law—just
because they think they have a good reason for disobedience
—would be an invitation to anarchy: it would be to make every
woman or man a law unto herself or himself.8 Nor would it be
either feasible or appropriate for us as judges to engage in a caseby-case assessment of the reasons that various citizens may have
for thinking that the law should be relaxed in their particular cases.
We can exempt a citizen from complying with a law, therefore, only
if there is a sound legal basis for such an exemption.9
And so we must ask whether there is such a basis in these cases.
The answer to that question—to the legal question, that is—turns
out to be relatively clear and straightforward. In the first appeal,
Father Edward invokes Provision 1 of the Newgarth Bill of Rights,
which (again, following the American Constitution on which it was
modeled) provides: “The State shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .” The second part of that provision, generally described
as the Religious Freedom Clause, has been interpreted to mean that
the government should accommodate people in the exercise of their
religious faiths, including by excusing them from complying with
general laws. See, e.g., State of Weymouth v. Amish Cmty.
This requirement of accommodation is not and could not be
absolute, of course. In Abraham v. Isaac, an action seeking an
anticipatory declaratory judgment, this Court ruled that the state’s
interest in the preservation of life meant that a father could not be
excused from the homicide laws despite his sincere belief that
God had commanded him to sacrifice his son. But if the
accommodation of a religious commitment is reasonably possible,
it is constitutionally commanded. Or at least so our cases

8. Reporter’s Note: Cf. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (arguing that
constitutionally mandatory free exercise exemptions would be impossible because they
would make every man “a law unto himself”) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 167 (1878)).
9. Reporter’s Note: A very similar position is energetically advanced in Nikolas
Bowie, The Government Could Not Work Doctrine, 105 VA. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2019).
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have held.10 See Amish Cmty.; see also Ben v. Hur; Paul v.
Corinthian Congregation.
In accordance with this constitutional provision, and with the
line of cases interpreting the provision, Father Edward should have
been excused from testifying about what he heard in confession. In
his mind and belief, such testimony would have been a gross
violation of his religious obligations. To be sure, like any other
constitutional right or privilege, this exemption does not come
without costs. Father Edward might have provided valuable
evidence; excusing him and other clergy who might find
themselves in his position means that such evidence may not be
available. But that is a cost which our Religious Freedom Clause
commands us to accept. Given the fact that many of our
jurisdictions have long recognized a priest-penitent privilege
without incurring catastrophic consequences, it can hardly be
argued that Durham has an overriding interest in compelling
clerics to violate their obligations of confidentiality. Nor should the
constitutional right of religious freedom be deemed less
valuable than the statutory rights protecting spouses, or attorneys
and their clients, in which similar costs of unproduced evidence are
routinely absorbed.
The judgment against Father Edward should accordingly
be reversed.
With respect to appellants Irenic and Pescar, by contrast, there
is no legal basis for exempting them from compliance with their
legal duties. I do not doubt the sincerity of either of these
appellants. If I were a legislator, I might perhaps attempt to craft
laws that would not burden their conscience (in Irenic’s case) or
their self-conception (in Pescar’s case). But I am a judge, not a
legislator, and I find no basis in Newgarthian law for exempting
these parties.
I would accordingly reverse the judgment in Appeal #476-1300 and affirm the judgments in Appeals #476-13-02 and #476-13-02.

10. Reporter’s Note: In this respect, it appears that Newgarthian jurisprudence is
similar to American free exercise doctrine from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), through
Employment Division.
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Broad, J. I arrive at the same conclusion as the Chief Justice, but
by an entirely different (and, I must say, with all due respect, less
facile) route.
The cases before us present complicated issues, and it is hardly
sufficient just to thumb through the text of the New Constitution to
see whether there happens to be some provision explicitly
authorizing an exemption. The result of that approach would be an
unreflective,
haphazard,
hodge-podge
constitutional
jurisprudence—one captive to the unplanned vicissitudes and
fortuitous contingencies of our political history—that would have
little or nothing to recommend it in terms of the fundamental
values cherished by our law: justice, fairness, equity, and
rationality. To be sure, our jurisprudence was once characterized
by this sort of narrow, text-bound formalism. In recent years,
however, we have come to recognize that the New Constitution is
not merely a legal code but something more august; it is an
embodiment (albeit an imperfect embodiment, as all human
constructions are) of our aspirations to justice and to reason.11 And
so our challenge and our task as judges is to interpret that
instrument liberally in order to bring it ever more in line with its
lofty aspirations.
In performing that task, we must start by consulting the legal
text, of course, but we must also read and construe the text in light
of principles of justice, as developed and articulated in moral
philosophy.12 If a particular outcome is recommended by relevant
principles of justice, the text of the New Constitution will usually
be supple enough to provide a textual basis for reaching the
just conclusion.
So, looking beyond the bare text, do we find any principled
basis for excusing one or more of these appellants from their legal

11. Reporter’s Note: American constitutional scholars have expressed similar
conceptions of the American Constitution. See generally, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION (2011); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985);
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICE (2004).
12. Reporter’s Note: In this respect, Justice Broad’s approach to constitutional
interpretation appears to be very much in line with that advocated in RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), and RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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duties? I believe we do. While all three claimants would seem to be
persons of reflection and integrity who may engage our
sympathies, one of them—namely, Father Edward—stands out
because his claim is based on a perceived duty to a Higher Power.13
His obligations derive from a Source that is, so to speak, beyond the
jurisdiction of our laws. We might compare him to an ambassador
of a foreign sovereign. Typically, when such an ambassador
transgresses our laws we do not simply arrest and incarcerate the
transgressor like an ordinary criminal, but rather remand him to
the justice of the sovereign that he serves.
And indeed, this was precisely the rationale that led to
Provision 1 of our Bill of Rights. As noted by the Chief Justice, that
provision was modeled on the First Amendment to the earlier
Constitution of the United States. Although the origins and
meaning of that amendment are obscure and contested by
historians, the legal authorities that construed it typically linked it
to an earlier and much-renowned law known as the Virginia
Statute for Religious Freedom, authored by the legendary Thomas
Jefferson.14 The Preamble to the Virginia Statute set forth its
rationale, beginning with the proposition that “Almighty God hath
created the mind free” and that infringements of religious freedom
are “a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion.”
Jefferson’s friend and political ally, James Madison, explained that
a person’s duties to God precede and take precedence over duties
to society.15 Thus, the antecedent to our Provision 1 was explicitly
anchored in the principle I have referred to above—namely, that
mundane legal duties imposed by our law should give way before
duties owed to a Higher Authority over whom our law can claim
no jurisdiction.
By contrast, the claims of the other two appellants may or may
not be meritorious as a matter of political morality, but they make
no claim to being based on any duties to a Higher Power. The

13. Reporter’s Note: A similar view is occasionally voiced in contemporary
scholarship. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty,
39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159 (2013).
14. Reporter’s Note: This statement might be referring to Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947), among other possible authorities.
15. Reporter’s Note: This statement seems to be a reference to James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted in CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 59–62 (J. F. Maclear ed., 1995).
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criteria they invoke—namely, morality and conscience (in the case
of appellant Irenic) and personal identity (in the case of appellant
Pescar)—are very much within the jurisdiction and competence of
our legislators and our law. Those legislators are perfectly free to
consider such criteria and, if they choose, to craft the law or to
create exceptions in order to accommodate such concerns. In the
case of the Military Conscription Law, the legislators did create a
number of exceptions, thereby showing that they were attentive to
such matters. But the laws in question create no exceptions
applicable to appellants Irenic or Pescar.
I would accordingly reverse the conviction of appellant Father
Edward but affirm the other two judgments. I hope that I have
made it clear that I reach this conclusion not simply on the basis
that there is a convenient legal text supporting Father Edward’s
claim, but rather because there is an exemption-supporting principle
that applies to Father Edward—namely, respect for duties arising
from a Source beyond our law’s jurisdiction—that does not apply
to appellants Irenic and Pescar, sincere as those claimants may be.
Penn, J. With all due respect, reading through Justice Broad’s
opinion, I feel that I have descended into a bipolar world. The first
half of the opinion, dealing with the nature of our New
Constitution and our obligations as judges to construe that
instrument in a reasoned, principled, justice-promoting way, has
an admirably progressive and enlightened quality. But the second
half of the opinion, in which Justice Broad concludes that only
claims for exemptions based on purported obligations to a Higher
Power should be recognized, reads like something excavated from
the Dark Ages.
Thus, I can endorse without reservation Justice Broad’s
explanation showing that as judges, we should interpret the New
Constitution in light of principles of morality and justice in an effort
to achieve a just and consistent constitutional doctrine. However,
the specific principle embraced in my colleague’s concurrence
—namely, the theocratic principle of deferring to duties imposed
by a Higher Power—seems to me utterly untenable for our
purposes, and for more than one reason.
In the first place, the very Provision 1 of our Bill of Rights on
which the Chief Justice relies, and on which Justice Broad likewise
347
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relies (though not, he protests, for its text but rather for the principle
that underlies that text), explicitly forbids any establishment of
religion. This prohibition entails that government cannot endorse
or rely on theological beliefs or propositions; and we have so held
in previous decisions.16 See Religious Liberty Ass’n v. Stevens; Sch. Bd.
v. McAllister. But if government cannot endorse or rely on
theological propositions, then it would seem to follow—a fortiori,
in fact—that government cannot suspend the operations of its
laws for particular individuals in deference to any supposed
Higher Power.
More generally and more fundamentally, whatever may have
been the case centuries ago in the times alluded to by Justice
Broad—the times of the “legendary” (as Justice Broad puts it*)
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison—it is plain that not all
Newgarthians today share any belief in the existence of a Higher
Power. On the contrary, a recent Plowden Survey reports that 57%
of those surveyed positively reject any such notion, while another
23% are unsure; only 14% of the respondents expressed an
affirmative belief in a Higher Power. (The remaining 6% evidently
declined to take any position on the question.)
My point, however, is not that religious believers constitute a
minority. A century or even a half-century ago, the figures might
have been reversed: those who doubted the existence of a Higher
Power were in the minority. The crucial point, rather, is that both
then and now, belief in a Higher Power is not shared. Some citizens
maintain such a belief; others reject it. But in a just society
committed to equal concern and respect for all its citizens, public
policies must be based on shared premises, so that all citizens can
join together in public deliberation, and so that no one is coerced
16. Reporter’s Note: A similar view is frequently expressed in modern religion clause
jurisprudence and scholarship. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 15 (1997); Kent Greenawalt, Five Questions About
Religion Judges Are Afraid to Ask, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 196,
197 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000); Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence:
The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).
* [Justice Penn’s Note] Justice Broad’s description may be more apt than he realizes:
an acclaimed historian has recently argued that Jefferson and Madison were not actual
historical persons, but rather, mythical figures constructed by later thinkers and politicians
in an effort to provide legitimacy to the American political order. See RANDOLPH BULTMANN,
DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (Newgarth University Press 4497).
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on the basis of premises that he or she reasonably rejects.17
Consequently, a contestable and contested belief in a Higher
Power who imposes duties cannot serve as an acceptable basis for
public policy.
This problem is overcome, however, if we regard Father
Edward’s objection as one grounded in conscience, or in moral
convictions and commitments. After all, even a non-religious
citizen is possessed of a conscience; he or she affirms that some
things are right and others are wrong. Conscience and moral
judgment are thus things that can be recognized and embraced by
all citizens, whether or not they are religious.
Once we understand that conscience is a legitimate matter for
government to recognize and respect, however, it quickly becomes
apparent that exemption from legal duties cannot be limited to
religious objectors; it must be extended to conscientious objectors
generally. In this respect, appellant Irenic is equally entitled to an
exemption. His opposition to war is a matter of conscience; it is
based on a sincere and reflective moral judgment. So, if we approve
appellant Father Edward’s request for an exemption, we must
approve appellant Irenic’s request as well.18
In reaching this conclusion, of course, I do not deny that Father
Edward’s plea is for him based on his perceived religious duty, or
his duty to what he takes to be a Higher Power. I merely observe
that for us, acting as officials of a republic composed of diversely
minded citizens, it is not the theistic dimension of his claim that is
relevant. We cannot say—and, fortunately, we need not say

17. Reporter’s Note: In this respect, Justice Penn’s thinking appears to resonate with
that of contemporary proponents of “public reason.” The outstanding example, of course, is
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 2005). For alternative elaborations, see,
for example, GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
MORALITY IN A DIVERSE AND BOUNDED WORLD (2011); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 39–75 (1990); KEVIN
VALLIER, LIBERAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC FAITH: BEYOND SEPARATION (2014). For criticisms of
the public reason position, see CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL
POLITICS (2002); David Enoch, The Disorder of Public Reason, 124 ETHICS 141 (2013).
18. Reporter’s Note: Justice Penn’s position in this respect appears similar to that taken
by some contemporary scholars. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, On the Constitutionality and Political
Morality of Granting Conscience-Protecting Exemptions Only to Religious Believers, in RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS, supra note 2, at 21; Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1085 (2014); cf. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 64 (2012) (“If matters of
religious conscience deserves [sic] toleration . . . then they do so because they involve matters
of conscience, not matters of religion.”) (second emphasis added).
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—whether his faith in a Higher Power reflects a true belief or a
lamentable delusion. What matters for our purposes is that Father
Edward sincerely believes that it would be morally and
categorically wrong for him to divulge what he was told in
confession. In that respect, he and appellant Irenic are alike or, as
we say, “similarly situated.” Both assert claims of conscience.
Unfortunately for her, appellant Pescar has no similar claim.
We have no reason to doubt the sincerity or the intensity of her
commitment to fishing. But even on her own account, she does not
assert any moral obligation to fish, or to fish outside of the legally
defined season. She asserts no claim of conscience. Rather, she
merely explains that fishing is something that is very important to
her based on her sense of who she is. Many a citizen who would be
excused from one or another legal duty could no doubt say much
the same thing. Like Pescar, they may be telling the truth. But that
is not a truth that justifies being exempted from legal duties.
My position, like Justice Broad’s, is based on the assumption
that our task as judges is to make judgments in accordance with
principles of justice, although the principle I would apply here—a
principle of respect for conscience—is different from his principle
of deference to a Higher Power. I recognize, of course, that my
rejection of text-bound formalism does not mean that I can simply
ignore the constitutional text. But in this respect, I see no great
difficulty in the present case.
Our New Constitution contains, as already pointed out, a
Religious Freedom Clause. “Religion” is an elusive term with no
agreed upon meaning. Traditionally the term has been understood
to refer to theistic belief and practice, but it is today widely
recognized that there are “religions” that are not theistic
— Buddhism, for example. I see no great difficulty in construing
“religion” to encompass all of the earnest, sincere moral convictions
that we typically associate with conscience. Indeed, we have
previously said as much, albeit in dicta. See Sidhartha v. State.
Whether or not we would conventionally describe all of these
convictions as “religious,” they do at least occupy a similar place
and perform a similar function for non-believers (like appellant
Irenic) that theistic beliefs have and perform for believers (like
Father Edward). That seems to me to be more than sufficient reason
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to construe our Religious Freedom Clause to cover such matters
of conscience.19
For any who might find this rationalization unsatisfying, we
can easily tie the right of conscience to the “equal treatment under
law” clause of Provision 7. As we have construed it, this provision
requires government to treat persons who are “similarly situated”
in the same way. See, e.g., Rights All. v. Epsilon. In this respect, for
present purposes appellant Irenic is similarly situated to appellant
Father Edward: both assert sincere objections of conscience to
otherwise applicable legal duties. It seems clear, as the Chief
Justice’s opinion shows, that under the New Constitution Father
Edward is entitled to an objection; equality means that the same
treatment must be extended to appellant Irenic.
Conversely, in this respect, appellant Pescar is not similarly
situated to the first two appellants. She does not assert an objection
of conscience. She is similarly situated, rather, to the thousands and
millions of other citizens who would ardently wish to be excused
from some legal duty or other, but who can assert no reason of
conscience in support of this wish.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the convictions of
appellants Father Edward and Irenic, but I would regretfully
sustain the conviction of appellant Pescar.
Mego, J. Seeking a suitable principle for resolving these claims,
Justice Penn argues that Justice Broad’s theocratic principle is
disqualified because it is not shared in our society. Of course I
agree. That anyone would invoke that principle in our own day, as
Justice Broad does, is surprising, and indeed disturbing. I also agree
that if Father Edward is exempted from his legal duty, appellant
Irenic must be exempted as well.
Unfortunately, the principle that Justice Penn would use to
reach that conclusion is vulnerable for the same reasons that he
offers in rejecting Justice Broad’s principle. A more careful

19. Reporter’s Note: In this respect, Justice Penn’s position appears to be similar to
that taken by some modern scholars. See, e.g., 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY 69–80 (2010); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of
Conscience, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 449, 461 (2013). Justice Penn’s position also appears
similar to that of the Supreme Court in the Seeger and Welsh cases cited earlier. See Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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reflection will show, I believe, that there are admissible grounds for
exempting appellants Father Edward and Irenic, but these grounds
extend to appellant Pescar as well. I will first explain why an appeal
to “conscience” is no more acceptable than an appeal to religious
duties, and I will then explain why the proper principle in this
context must be one of respect for personal identity
I.
Justice Penn places great emphasis on “conscience,” which he
equates with judgments about “morality.” And people can make
judgments about “morality,” he thinks, whether or not they
associate morality with any Higher Power. In this respect, he is
surely right. But does it follow that there is any socially shared
commitment to “morality,” and hence to “conscience”? I believe we
can only answer that question affirmatively if we indulge ourselves
in a massive equivocation on the term “morality.”
It is hardly a novel observation that people in our society
disagree over particular moral judgments. (Is telling a lie always
“morally” wrong? Is late-term abortion wrong?) But, more
importantly, they disagree over what morality even is. People of
diverse views may use the same word to mean vastly different
things.20 And once we acknowledge these differences, it becomes
apparent that there is no shared belief in the existence of anything
—no single or coherent entity, nor class of desiderata—that we can
call “morality.”
Thus, some people associate morality with the will of God, or
with a providential plan. In this view, to say that “stealing is
morally wrong” means something like: “God has commanded us,
‘Thou shalt not steal.’” This way of thinking is congenial, I suppose,
to Father Edward. To others, though, “morality” is a purely human
affair; it is based on maximizing happiness for the greatest number.
So “stealing is wrong” means that stealing will result in a net
overall loss of (human) happiness. To still others, “morality” refers

20. Reporter’s Note: Some perceive a similar condition in our own time. Michael
Smith has remarked that “if one thing becomes clear by reading what philosophers writing
in meta-ethics today have to say, it is surely that enormous gulfs exist between them, gulfs
so wide that we must wonder whether they are talking about a common subject matter.”
MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 3 (1994). For a much-discussed diagnosis of this
situation, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984).
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to an ostensible duty of rational consistency: we should act only on
principles that we consistently want others to follow as well. So
“stealing is wrong” means that you cannot at the same time steal
your neighbor’s property and also want your neighbor to steal
your property.
And, of course, there are plenty of other views. Among these
are various more skeptical positions. By one view, moral judgments
are basically just expressions of emotion or attitude: to say that
stealing is wrong is to say, basically, “I don’t like stealing,” or
maybe, “Boo for stealing!” By another view, moral judgments and
norms are essentially fictions, or noble lies, that society inculcates
in people in order to induce them to behave in productive and nonharmful ways—or perhaps, in a darker version, in order to keep the
weaker in subjection to the stronger.21
We might try to say that there is still something—some thing
—we call “morality,” and that all of these different positions
amount to different conceptions or theories about what that thing
is. But this is a deeply implausible way of viewing the matter. It
seems more accurate, and more economical, just to say that the
same word (“morality”) is being used to refer to a whole range of
different things or considerations (which may or may not exist)
— the will of God, the happiness of society, the emotions or
attitudes people have towards different kinds of actions.
Once we recognize that the word “morality” is being used to
refer to a host of quite different things, it becomes apparent that in
our society there is no more a shared belief in “morality” than there
is a shared belief in the existence of a Higher Power. If possible, the
disagreements about morality are even greater, albeit more veiled
because of the common term “morality.” If society and the state
cannot act on “religious” premises because these are not shared, as
Justice Penn persuasively argues, then it ought to follow that
society and the state cannot act on “moral” premises either, and for
the same reason. Moreover, as Justice Penn makes clear,
“conscience” typically refers to a person’s judgments about
“morality,” or about what is “morally” right and wrong. If we
cannot say (except by equivocating) that there is a shared

21. Reporter’s Note: For discussion of apparently similar positions in modern metaethics, see generally MACINTYRE, supra note 20.
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commitment to “morality,” then we also cannot say without
equivocation that there is any shared commitment to “conscience.”
II.
The situation looks bleak. Still, I believe there is a way out of
this predicament. We can accept that although in form both
religious people like Father Edward and earnestly moralistic
people like Francis Irenic purport to be making statements about
something outside or independent of themselves (God, or Justice,
or Morality—whatever it is), these people are, in reality and most
fundamentally, telling us something about themselves—about who
they are. Of course, we need not deny that these people believe they
are speaking of something outside themselves; we need not even
deny that in this belief they might possibly be correct. But even if
we are atheists who deny the existence of God or moral skeptics
who doubt that there is any such thing as morality, we can still
understand that when Father Edward speaks of his duty to God, or
when Francis Irenic speaks of his moral duty not to participate in
war, these men are disclosing something important about
themselves. They are disclosing beliefs and commitments that
constitute them as the particular people they are. They are revealing and
asserting their identities.
Moreover, we can acknowledge that there is good reason for us,
and for our law, to respect people’s basic identities, and to refrain
from violating or infringing people’s identities. This observation
rests on a crucial distinction between identity and interests—and on
the priority of the former over the latter.22
Most of our actions and decisions affect our and other people’s
interests—their desires, expectations, or preferences. Now,
interests inevitably compete with each other. If I invest more of my
money in a retirement plan, I will have less money available for this
year’s vacation. If the government spends more on military
defense, it has less to spend on education. So there are trade-offs to
be made: and weighing or trading off interests against each other is
at the heart of what law and government do. And yet interests do

22. Reporter’s Note: For an emphasis on this distinction in contemporary scholarship,
see CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 204 (2017); Jocelyn Maclure, Conscience, Religion,
and Exemptions: An Egalitarian View, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS, supra note 2, at 9, 12.
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not exist “in the air,” so to speak, or in a void. The very possibility
of interests depends on persons who possess those interests. Persons
are essential and primary; interests are derivative. And so an injury
to those persons—to their identities—is of a different order than a
mere denial of interests.
The basic point can be made in contractarian terms for those
who find illumination in that way of thinking (which of course was
hugely influential in pre-Spiral political theorizing). Suppose that
in a state of nature or in a pre-political state, we were to deliberate
and negotiate about how to form a social contract for our mutual
benefit. As presumptively rational agents, what would you or I give
up, or what would we risk, in exchange for the benefits of a civil
and political order?
You might well find it beneficial to sacrifice various interests,
even including interests that you might describe as liberties, in
order to obtain the blessings of government and rule of law, with
the security and order that these would bring. But you could hardly
agree to sacrifice your identity, no matter how great the benefits.
Because having lost your identity, you would no longer be there to
enjoy those benefits. As an old saying of unknown origins put it:
“What doth it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his
own soul?”
Unlike commitments to a Higher Power or to conscience, the
commitment to what I might call the integrity of identity is truly
shared by everyone in our society. Not everyone believes in God
(much less in the God of Father Edward). Not everyone believes in
morality in any meaningful, non-equivocating sense, and without
a shared commitment to morality there is no shared commitment
to conscience. But everyone has an identity. Because without an
identity, a person would not be a person. Put it this way: if
someone denies having an identity, she has declared herself to be
nobody, and has thereby disqualified herself from participating in
the discussion.
So if there is any principle that can help us resolve these claims
for exemptions, it is not the theocratic principle, nor the principle
of freedom of conscience. Rather it is the principle of the integrity
of identity. And it follows that a crucial distinction for sorting out
the various reasons people have for wishing to be excused from
complying with their legal duties is the distinction between claims
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based on infringement of identity and claims based on the
impairment of interests. The person who says, sincerely, that
compliance will violate or infringe her identity is in a very different
and much stronger position than the person who says that
compliance will be costly, or inconvenient, or painful.
But applying this distinction leads us to a result quite different
from those favored by my colleagues. Appellant Pescar has
earnestly and lucidly explained how being a fisher is central to her
conception of herself—to her identity. Her claim for an exemption
from the fishing regulation is accordingly very strong. It is surely
as strong as those of appellants Father Edward and Irenic. After all,
those parties have not even made any explicit claims about identity.
We can credit their claims only by inferring that when Father
Edward talks about God and when Francis Irenic talks about
conscience and moral duty, they are telling us something about
how they are constituted—about what is core to their identities.
That is a plausible enough inference, I think, and so I am happy to
recognize exemptions for them. Even so, their claims are surely no
stronger than that of Emilia Pescar, who spoke emphatically and
explicitly in terms of her self-conception or identity.
In reaching this conclusion, I am not averse to talking about and
recognizing a “freedom of religion” (which is to be sure explicitly
set forth in our New Constitution) or a “freedom of conscience”
(which is not explicitly acknowledged but is without doubt a
venerable concept in our tradition). I merely urge that we
acknowledge that those rights or commitments have their
grounding in the principle of the integrity of identity.23 And I urge
23. Reporter’s Note: In justifying religious freedom and freedom of conscience in
terms of a more fundamental commitment to personal identity, Justice Mego’s position
resembles one taken in a good deal of contemporary scholarship, jurisprudence, and legal
advocacy. See, e.g., Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 9–11, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); ROBERT AUDI, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE 42, 71 (2011); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 293 (1999); AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 151–91
(2009); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 67–68 (1996); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103, 113–18 (2015); Troy L. Booher, Finding Religion for the First
Amendment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 471–72 (2004); Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other
Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the
Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45 U. S.F. L. REV. 389, 400–02 (2010); David B. Cruz,
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as well that we give effect to that principle even when there does
not happen to be a clear textual basis for invoking it in a given case.
For those who demand such a textual basis, I would be happy
enough to resort to the “equal treatment of the law” clause of
Provision 7, as generally explained by Justice Penn but adjusted in
accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
I would accordingly reverse all judgments below and would
grant the exemptions claimed by all appellants.
Kharossiv, J. In her impressive and elegant opinion, Justice
Mego has reduced this line of reasoning and jurisprudence to its
logical conclusion—or rather, I might say, to its inevitable reductio
ad absurdum. Indeed, in a rough way, my colleagues’ opinions track
the reductionist historical course of our jurisprudence.
Start with the idea that was once unapologetically asserted by
the founders (whether real or legendary) of this line of our
jurisprudence: namely, that our law should exempt those who
act, as they suppose, from duty to a Higher Power. Can that idea
serve to distinguish some exemption claims from others, as Justice
Broad contends?
Apparently not. Or at least, so Justices Penn and Mego tells us;
Justice Mego is shocked—yes, shocked—that anyone “in our own
day” would even suggest the possibility. Now, as an aside, I might
observe that in the abstract, I am not sure why what Justice Mego
deprecatingly calls “the theocratic principle” cannot serve as a basis
for law. It is true that the idea is one that many today, including
myself, would find woefully unpersuasive, because we do not
believe that there is any Higher Power. And yet many of our fellow

Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2002); Rebecca Redwood French, From
Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law,
41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 77–78 (1999); Christie Hartley & Lori Watson, Political Liberalism and
Religious Exemptions, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS, supra note 2, at 97, 106–07; Kenneth L. Karst,
Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 357 (1986);
Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 61 (2018);
Maclure, supra note 22, at 11; Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 344–45 (2001); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2593 (2015) (articulating that the Constitution protects right of “persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity”); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 636
(2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“A person’s response to [religious] doctrine, language, and
imagery . . . reveals a core aspect of identity—who that person is and how she faces
the world.”).
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citizens do believe the idea, and it is arguable that the idea is
embedded in aspects of our law, including the Religious Freedom
Clause. As it happens, many of our laws are based on ideas that I
myself do not believe; but they are laws nonetheless.
More generally, and with apologies, it seems to me that in
maintaining that a society or a government can permissibly act only
on premises shared by all of its citizens, my more sanguine
colleagues consign themselves to a fantasy world. Consistently
applied in a highly pluralistic society like ours, this notion would
quickly issue in political paralysis; and so, of course, the notion is
not consistently applied, but rather becomes an occasion for
sophistry and hypocrisy. The claim that premises need to be shared
by all citizens gets watered down into something like a requirement
that the sharing extend to all reasonable citizens, at which point it
becomes faintly ridiculous: a reasonable person seems to mean little
more than “a person who thinks more or less in the way I do.” For
myself, I believe my church-going neighbor is profoundly mistaken
in her beliefs; but so far as I can tell she is no less “reasonable”—no
less intelligent, sensible, or sociable—than I am. With all due
respect, I cannot help but suspect that my colleagues who talk
about a “community” constituted around “shared premises” or
“shared values” are indulging in the same sort of wishful thinking
and projection that they so often ascribe to the “sectarian” folks
they disdain.
But these are cavils. The pertinent fact is not legal or
philosophical but rather sociological: whether or not it is excluded
by Provision 1 or by some requirement of shared premises, the
theistic principle has come to seem unacceptable. In this respect, I
accept Justices Penn’s and Mego’s views as authoritative—not
because those views are compelling on their merits, but because the
Justices who hold them are typical of our governing classes.
And so we begin by reducing the basis for exemption (as Justice
Penn does) into a respect for conscience and morality. Upon further
examination and experience, though, this position also comes to
seem inadequate, and so (as Justice Mego’s opinion nicely reflects)
we dissolve conscience into something supposedly even more
elemental—selfhood, integrity, or personal identity. With identity,
Justice Mego believes she has reached bedrock. But when subjected
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to the pressure of examination, the bedrock turns out to be as
shifting and insubstantial as sand in a desert storm.
“Personal identity” is after all the most elusive of concepts. Any
person—any Tom, Dick, or Harriet—is made up of countless
attributes or features: physical features like height and weight and
hair color, cognitive or mental features including knowledge and
beliefs and language, emotional features or personality traits like
cheerfulness or stinginess. The list could go on and on. So, among
all these myriad features, which ones constitute the person’s
“identity”?
All of them? Then, if any single feature changes, is the old
identity replaced by a new one? Every time I get a haircut or clip
my fingernails I become a new person with a new identity? How
utterly disorienting! This view being manifestly untenable, we
evidently are to suppose that some of the person’s features are
identity-constituting and others are merely incidental. But then
how do we know—how does the person herself know—which
features constitute identity and which are incidental, perhaps
bearing only upon a person’s “interests”?
My recollection from undergraduate days is that the problem of
personal identity is one that philosophers have struggled with, but
without discernible success. What is it (if anything) that allows us
to say that the ninety-year-old Charles has the same identity, or is
“the same person,” as the one-year-old Chucky, even though
scarcely a single physical or cognitive feature of the infant remains
in the elderly man. Perhaps nothing: personal identity may be (as
some philosophers think) a kind of illusion. Or, if we find that
conclusion too dispiriting, we might look to, say, bodily
continuity—or perhaps continuity of memory—as the most
promising answers. But each of these answers invites telling
objections; I need hardly review them here. And in any case, neither
the physical nor psychological accounts of personal identity will
help any of the appellants in this case. After all, none of those
parties contends that compliance with the legal duties to which
they object will interrupt their bodily continuity or their memory of
events in their personal histories.
Perhaps Father Edward might offer us some account of
personal identity in terms of a ghostly immortal soul, or something
of that sort. But although (unlike Justices Penn and Mego) I would
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not rule out such a theory a priori merely because of its “religious”
nature, I doubt very much that any such spiritual account would be
serviceable for our purposes. Or that it would be at all helpful to
these appellants. After all, so far as I can tell, none of them has
claimed that compliance with the objectionable duties will
somehow extinguish their immortal souls.
Justice Mego offers no philosophical or theological account of
what “identity” consists of. Hers, it seems, is a more permissively
egalitarian or perhaps libertarian approach: she seems to be saying
that every one of us gets to choose for ourselves which features are
central to our identity, or to our “self-conception.” And why not? If
my neighbor Joe believes that he is essentially a golfer, or a
flautist—if he believes that these features define “who he really
is”—who am I to gainsay? (Even if Joe can’t hit a fairway to save
himself and his flute playing is wretched.) And if he tells me he is
Napoleon Bonaparte, or Caligula, it would be not merely pointless
but imprudent for me to contradict him.
And yet . . . people change their self-conceptions constantly.
People who thought of themselves as being Christians to the core
become agnostics, and vice versa. People who thought of
themselves as poets or musicians or incipient novelists learn that
their talents are disappointingly meager and begin to think of
themselves instead as teachers, or lawyers, or bird watchers. Have
their “identities” thereby changed? Do we really think—do they
think—that they are no longer “the same person”? Would it seem
other than crazy, for example, to suggest that they should no longer
be bound by, say, their former debts (or answerable for their former
crimes) because it was someone else—some other person—who
assumed those debts, or who committed those crimes? After all,
what could be more unjust than to punish one person for another
person’s crimes?
To be sure, we do sometimes say, for example, that “Mary is a
new person” ever since she changed her religion, or changed her
job, or started seeing a new boyfriend. These ways of speech no
doubt express some sort of metaphorical point. At the same time,
we don’t for a moment doubt that Mary2 is bound by all of the
obligations incurred by Mary1, and is entitled to all of the property
and benefits of Mary1. Nor do we think we need to get acquainted
all over again. (“I knew your predecessor well, for many years
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—charming person, although sometimes a bit overbearing—but
now, tell me about yourself.”) Mary is still Mary.
In short, changes—even quite fundamental changes that affect
a person’s self-conception—do not actually result in a change in
personhood, or in personal “identity,” in any very strong sense of
the term. To appreciate this point, we need only consider closely
the claims made by Justice Mego in her eloquent opinion in this
case. Suppose the government prevents Emilia Pescar from fishing
during the months between September and May (if necessary by
putting her in jail). Justice Mego tells us that the government
would thereby “violate” or “infringe on” Ms. Pescar’s “identity.”
What does this even mean? That the person who was Ms.
Pescar will somehow pass out of existence (perhaps to revive on
May 1 when fishing season begins again)? That seems an
extravagant characterization.
Or suppose we embrace the extravagance and say, “despite
outward appearances, the person going under the name of Emilia
Pescar from October through April has a different identity—she is
actually not the same person—as the Emilia Pescar from May
through September.” So it seems that a person (the summer Pescar)
has been deprived of existence, at least for half of the year (and
perhaps forever, if we were to jail her for an indefinite term). That
seems tragic—because, after all, every person is precious. But then
again, a new person (the winter Pescar), one who wouldn’t
otherwise have existed, has been brought into existence. That seems
cause for jubilation—because every person is precious. Perhaps (all
persons being of “equal moral worth”) the tragic loss and the
transcendent gain cancel each other out?
But then probably, as is usual in these kinds of lofty
deliberations, I am missing the point. Probably when Justice Mego
suggests that a person’s identity is “violated” or “infringed,” she
doesn’t mean that the person and her identity are somehow
extinguished. Maybe the point is just that the person isn’t permitted
to live in accordance with her “identity,” or her “self-conception.”
If this is what Justice Mego is saying, she is surely right. But of
course, we knew that all along. Now it seems we are just saying that
the person isn’t permitted to live as he or she really, really wants to
live, or as he or she thinks he or she should live. That observation
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merely brings us back to where we started. But where is the reason
for giving special priority to the claim for an exemption?
Moreover, it seems to me that on this understanding of Justice
Mego’s position, she forfeits much of her argument for giving
special priority to identity-based claims. She argues, for example,
that identity-based claims must take precedence over interestbased claims because interests can’t exist in a void; they presuppose
a person (and hence, she adds, in great haste, an “identity”) in order
to exist at all. But on the reduced understanding of what it means
to “infringe” an “identity,” there is still a person in the picture (and
hence, of necessity, an “identity”?)—a person who can enjoy
“interests.”
In a similar way, if I am a rational agent in a state of nature
negotiating about what to give up in order to obtain the benefits of
law and government, it may be true that I would never sacrifice my
“identity” if that means something like sacrificing my life, or my
personhood. Because then, as Justice Mego explains, I wouldn’t
exist to enjoy the benefits of law and government anyway.
(Actually, in my own case at least, I believe I would accept a one-infour chance of personal annihilation in exchange for, say, the Taj
Mahal.) But if we’re only talking about sacrificing “identity” in the
sense of sometimes not being permitted to live in the way I want to
live (or, if you prefer, in the way the-person-I-think-I-am would
want to live), then I might be perfectly willing to make concessions
in that “identity” column. I might give up a smidgeon of my
“identity” in exchange for a windfall to my “interests.” Or, to be
blunt, I might fail any longer to see the pertinent difference
distinguishing the “interests” column from the “identity” column.
I recognize that arguments based on selfhood or personhood or
“identity” are currently fashionable. I think I even understand
some of the reasons for that popularity. Those reasons are
conspicuous in Justice Mego’s opinion. In an age of massive and
seemingly irresolvable disagreements about what kind of God (if
any) exists and about what “morality” even is (not to mention the
more obvious disagreements about all manner of specific “moral”
and “justice” issues), it is natural that advocates, including lawyers
and judges, would search for some more secure foundation for
making normative arguments and normative judgments.
“Identity” has seemed to provide such a foundation to many.
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Because it seems (as Justice Mego beautifully explains) that every
one of us has to have, and to value, “identity.”
Unfortunately, we have no adequate and workable theory or
account of what “identity” is. And so arguments based on
“identity” end up trading on the same kinds of confusion and
equivocation that Justice Mego skillfully diagnoses with respect
to “morality.”
My own conclusion is that we have not come up with any viable
distinction or principle that would permit us to distinguish among
the multitude of reasons that people have for wishing to be excused
from complying with their legal duties. Once we’ve rejected the
“Higher Authority” principle (as it seems we have, whether or not
we needed to), neither the “conscience” principle nor the “personal
identity” principle can check our descent. And so our choices, it
seems (unless we are to give up our pretensions to being
“principled”—a prospect at which my colleagues shudder with
horror), are to exempt everybody who wants to be excused from
complying with a law, or nobody.
But that is scarcely a choice at all. We obviously cannot exempt
everybody: as the Chief Justice observes, this would amount to
anarchy. And so we must exempt . . . nobody.
This, I think, is where my colleagues’ logic leaves us. Contrary
to their lofty intentions, it seems, they have convinced me: I accept
the conclusion of their logic—even if they don’t. I would
accordingly affirm all of the judgments.
Per curiam. Lacking a majority position or opinion, we have
had to resort to counting votes. Among five Justices, four (Crisp,
Broad, Penn, and Mego) have voted to reverse the conviction of
appellant Father Edward. The judgment in Appeal #476-13-00 is
accordingly REVERSED. Only two Justices have voted to
reverse the conviction of appellant Francis Irenic, and only one
Justice has voted to reverse the conviction of appellant Emilia
Pescar. The judgments in Appeals #476-13-01 and #476-13-02 are
accordingly AFFIRMED.
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Penn, J. (with whom J. Mego joins).
Appellants Francis Irenic and Emilia Pescar have moved for
rehearing. Upon reconsideration, I remain of the view that I
expressed in my initial opinion; and Justice Mego authorizes me to
say that she would continue to adhere to the views she expressed
in her opinion. We both agree, however, that an outcome granting
an exemption to appellant Father Edward but denying an
exemption to Francis Irenic constitutes an intolerable violation of
the fundamental principle of equal treatment. Justice Mego would
reach the same conclusion regarding appellant Emilia Pescar. The
commitment to equality is fundamental to our constitutional
order. In order to maintain equality, we therefore deem it necessary
to deny all of the claims for exemptions. Justice Kharossiv agrees
with this conclusion. The convictions in all three appeals are
accordingly AFFIRMED.
Crisp, C.J., and Broad, J., dissent from this judgment for the
reasons expressed in their initial opinions.
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